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Is The National Flood
Insurance Program Really
National Land Use in
Disguise?
by Robert D. Sokolove*
Over the last decade, this country has experienced an envi-
ronmental revolution like none before in its history. Landmark
legislation such as the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.§§ 1857 et. seq.,
as amended, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1252, et seq., as amended, and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321,
et. seq., as amended, (NEPA) represent the cornerstone of en-
vironmental concern and pollution abatement at the Federal
level.
Additionally, it should be noted that as an offshoot of the
Federal NEPA, twenty states have developed their own "little
NEPA's" to address broad environmental concerns at the state
or local level.
It is interesting to observe what areas the above legislation
addresses. First, there is an emphasis on pollution abatement.
The Clean Air Act addresses all types of air pollution ranging
from stationary sources (such as factories) to mobile sources
(such as automobiles). The Water Pollution Control Act natu-
rally encourages and mandates clean water and goes so far as
to address indirect sources of water pollution such as
pesticides carried by runoff.
Second, NEPA attempts to advance for the first time, a
broad and sometimes vague national goal of "protecting the
environment, assuring an aesthetically and culturally pleasing
surrounding and enhancing the over-all quality of life."' Finally,
NEPA mandates that all Federal agencies take a leading role in
carrying out the objectives of the Act through policy, regula-
tions and laws. 2
What is most interesting about these landmark pieces of
legislation is not what they address but rather what they do not
address. Significantly, specific controls and objectives dealing
with land use are not included in the list above nor are they pre-
sently included in any type of Federal legislation.
* J.D. Franklin Pierce Law Center (1977), Attorney Advisor, U.S. Department
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2 42 U.S.C.§4332(1)
The absence of national land use legislation continues to
frustrate many individuals who feel that the only way problems
associated with air, sound, and water pollution, historic preser-
vation, and population growth can be corrected is with some
system of land use control at the Federal level. Accordingly, it
has been suggested by the Senate Interior Committee that a
National land use bill be designed to alleviate or solve the
following problems: (1) increasing pressure from conflicting
proposed uses of particular valuable land resources; (2) con-
flicts between environmental values and projected population
and technology pressures; (3) inconsistencies in land use aims
and consequences of various governmentally initiated, fi-
nanced, and sanctioned projects; and (4) failure of private en-
terprise to consider land use consequences as a high priority
factor in planning for economic growth." 3
Given the premise that these enormous national problems
cannot be solved without national land use legislation, it is
curious indeed that Congress has not to this date passed such a
bill. Admittedly, it is not for lack of an attempt. Since 1970,
thirteen bills involving national land use in one form or another
have been advanced in the House and Senate but as yet, Con-
gress has chosen not to accept the idea.
The majority of those bills advanced in Congress were
introduced by Senator Henry Jackson and Representative
Morris Udall. During the tenure of the 93rd Congress, 1973-
1974, national land use legislation came closest to passage
when the Senate passed S. 268 by a 64-21 vote on June 21,
1973. Subsequently, H.R. 10294, introduced by Morris Udall,
was matched against S. 268 but was postponed indefinitely by a
Rules Committee vote in February of 1974.
In May of 1974, the Rules Committee finally sent H.R. 10294
to the floor of the House. On June 11, 1974, the Bill was
rejected on a procedural vote for consideration by a margin of
211 to 204. No true national land use bill has ever been so close
to passage.
Commentators have advanced numerous theories as to why
Congress has continually rejected the concept of national land
use. The rationale most often suggested is political in nature
with a basis in law. This rationale was put forth by M. Bruce
Johnson in A Critique of the Concept of Federal Land Use
Regulation.4 Johnson proposed that national land use is
"obviously a process of transferring our society from a private
to a common basis of property ownership, an insidious
corrosion on individual rights."
Another commentator stated that "[the bill] would insure the
creation of new institutions of government at the state level,
strongly influenced by Washington, whose success could be
assured only if they move to seize complete control over the
use and exchange of land." 5
Although such predictions of "socialism by land use" seemed
absurd to many, particularly environmentalists who pushed for
passage of the various land use bills, they were sufficiently per-
suasive to make Congress take a closer than usual look at what
was before it.
Segments of the most recent bill 6 included mandatory state
3 In Zisser, The National Land Use Policy Acts (The Evolution and Analysis of a
Reasonable Idea) in THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN LAND
DEVELOPMENT, 108 (1977)
4 5 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 575 (1975)
McClaughry, The Land Use Planning Act-An Idea We Can Do Without, 3
ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS, 597 (1974).
6 HR 3510, 94th Cong. 1975
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land use programs dealing with "areas of critical state con-
cern,"7 "large-scale subdivision and development projects,"'
"developments of regional impact" 9 and a section on "co-
ordination and consistency. '"10 These types of approaches to
solving problems of land use on more than a local level have
aroused fear of a federal leviathan moving toward federal
zoning. In fact, because of the fear of federal "intrusion" into
traditional state areas of control, it would take a strong state-
ment of assurance before many would believe that the federal
government was not usurping all of the state land use powers
with these bills.
No such statement was strong enough to convince the
doubters. This situation led Michael Zisser to conclude, "The
lack of guidelines was enough to keep environmentalists uncer-
tain of their support, but it was also enough to keep the major
resource industries certain of their opposition to any
implementation of guidelines."'
Zisser quoted John McClaughry as stating, "this (system)
would inevitably lead to a new federalism where the freehold
theory of property ownership would be transferred into a
'social property' theory. The State-in the last analysis the
Federal Government would accede to the rights of the
medieval king. Land would no longer be 'owned' by private citi-
zens but merely 'held for a superior'." 1
2
Apparently, views such as those of Johnson and
McClaughry were sufficient to convince Congress that national
land use was too risky a business to legislate. Because of the
emotionalism evidenced by the issue, it is clear that the will of
Congress was, at least in part, politically motivated. How much
of its decision was political and how much was truly a desire to
maintain traditional states' rights in the land use area is open to
speculation.
But a funny thing happened on the way to the land use bill
defeats. Congress debated, passed and eventually
strengthened the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP).13
An understanding of the history of this program is crucial to a
thorough grasp of the ongoing land use controversy.
During the late 1960's, Congress became increasingly con-
cerned with the tremendous loss of life, property and federal
money as a result of flood disasters. Therefore, in August 1968,
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 was enacted as Title
XIII of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Public
Law 90-448 ("1968 Act"). The 1968 Act provides flood
insurance at actuarial rates for new construction and sub-
stantial improvements made to existing structures. The Act
also provides flood insurance to properties that were already in
existence at the time the area they were located in was
identified as having special flood hazards. As a condition pre-
cedent, the Act required that flood-prone communities adopt
local flood plain management measures to reduce or avoid
flood damage in connection with all new construction if those
communities wanted to benefit from the program.
The 1968 Act was amended by Title IV of the Housing Act of
1969, Public Law 91-152, to create the Emergency Flood In-
surance Program. Under this Program, insurance is
immediately provided at subsidized rates for all property,
HR 3510, Title III, Sec. 302.
8 Id. at Sec. 304.
Id. at Sec. 306.
Id. at Sec. 308.
Supra, footnote 3, at 187.
12 Supra, footnote 5, at 598.
13 Codified at 42 U.S.C.§§4001 et seq.
including new construction and substantial improvements.1 4
By 1973 Congress realized that the benefit of flood insurance
under the NFIP did not itself offer sufficient incentive to
reasonably assure local community participation in the
Program. By the Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Public
Law 93-234, (the 1973 Act), Congress opted to make
participation in the NFIP a mandatory precondition in flood
prone areas for the financing of numerous federal benefit pro-
grams and obtaining loans from federally supervised lending
institutions.15
It should be noted that by Section 703 of the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1977, P.L. 95-128, Congress
removed the prohibition against the extension of financing by
federally supervised institutions in flood hazard areas of non-
participating communities. However, Congress did not alter
the flood plain management measures connected with the
program.
It is the flood plain management criteria that must be exa-
mined in light of the earlier discussion of "national land use" to
determine the answer to a key question. Namely, do the
"criteria for land management and use" 16 as promulgated in the
Code of Federal Regulations pursuant to the National Flood
Insurance Program and authorizing Acts constitute "national
land use?"
On the surface, these provisions appear to fit that
description. If a community wants to accept the benefit of
Federal Flood Insurance, it must first become a "participant" in
the program. A condition precedent to such participation
includes inter alia that the community must apply land use
control measures to all areas within the identified special flood
hazard boundaries. The community must require that special
land use measures to effectuate flood control take precedence
over conflicting law or codes presently in operation."
These measures include such requirements as mandating
that all new construction and substantial improvements (as
defined by regulation) of residential structures have the lowest
floor (including basement) elevated to or above the base flood
level. The same regulations apply to non-residential structures
or in the alternative they must be flood proofed. 1
The measures also include a provision that until a floodway
(for riverine overflow) is designated, no use of land or even the
use of land fill will be permitted if it will increase the water
surface elevation of the 100 year flood (defined as the "base" or
statutory flood for these purposes) by more than one foot at
any level. 9
In addition, the land criteria regulations state that once a
regulatory floodway has been designated, the community must
prohibit all encroachments including fill that would impair its
ability to discharge flood waters resulting from a 100 year
flood.
2 0
Admittedly, these land use measures and controls are very
strict in nature. They leave little discretion on the part of the
community which chooses to participate in the program.
Here, however, two important points must be made. First, it
should be emphasized that as strict as the minimum land use
criteria of the NFIP may be, the program is voluntary. No com-
14 42 U.S.C. §4056
1 42 U.S.C. §4106
16 24 C.F. R. part 1910
17 24 C. F. R. part 1910.3(b)
18 24 C. F. R. 1910.3(b)(4)
11 24 CF.R 1910.3(c)(10)
20 24 C. F. R. 1910.3(d)(3)
munity must adopt the land use provisions as outlined above
unless it chooses to accept the federal benefit of Federal Flood
Insurance.
Second, although the U.S. Department of Housing and
Urban Development, through its Federal Insurance Adminis-
tration, publishes and monitors the land use criteria as well as
provides technical assistance to the various communities
which request such, it is the communities themselves, not the
Federal Government, which ultimately adopt the land use
criteria for their area.
These two points were the subject of recent litigation in the
Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.21 The case,
Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Secretary of HUD,
was brought as a class action challenging the constitutional-
ity of the NFIP, particularly as it may conflict with the states'
rights of sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment. Plaintiffs in
the case claimed, in essence, that the "burden" to the com-
munities (not receiving federal financial assistance) is so great if
they do not participate in the NFIP, that the program is no
longer "voluntary" but "mandatory" in nature. Further, the
plaintiffs in Texas Landowners contended that the land use
management is "federal" and therefore conflicts with the Tenth
Amendment.
Relying on the decision in National League of Cities v.
Usury, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) where the Court held that amend-
ments to the Fair Labor Standards Act conflicted with the
state's Tenth Amendment Rights, plaintiffs were not as
successful in challenging the NFIP. The Court distinguished
National League of Cities by stating that there, the provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act were mandatory while here,
the land use management provisions were voluntary in that a
community could choose whether or not it wanted to
participate. The rationale for this distinction was based upon
the Court's opinion that unlike the FLSA, there was a benefit to
be derived by participation in the NFIP.
Further, Judge Waddy, relying on the decision in County of
Los Angeles v. Marshall 22 by Judge Richey just a few months
earlier, found that the NFIP, as a benefit program, had "rea-
sonable" conditions attached.
Although Texas Landowners has been noticed for appeal to
the United States Circuit Court for the District of Columbia in
July of 1978, it is significant that Judge Waddy, in his decision,
acknowledged for the first time that Congress intended the
NFIP to be a benefit program and voluntary in nature. By
suggesting that the minimum land use requirements of the
NFIP are appropriate as conditions to a federal benefit, the
Court has determined that the proper emphasis of the program
should be the federal benefit to be derived by the communities
and not the "burden" of land management criteria as suggested
by the Texas Landowners plaintiffs.
Congress apparently has not been inconsistent by rejecting
national land use but accepting it defacto through the auspices
of the NFIP. The courts have remained consistent by
concluding that the land use provisions of the NFIP are
reasonable conditions to a federal benefit. Thus, the question
of whether the NFIP is really national land use in disguise, must
be answered: "no."
11 See: Texas Landowners Rights Association, et al. v. Harris, Civ. Action No.
77-1962 (D.C.Cir.)
21 442 F.Supp. 1186 (D.D.C. 1977)
Behavioral Study of Justice
Goldberg and the Supreme
Court
For the period of 1962 to 1969, the United States Supreme
Court has been accused of "judicial activism" and of lacking
"judicial self-restraint." Supporters of self-restraint have
accused the Justices of overstepping their authority, of making
themselves into super-legislators, and of revealing to the public
that the decisions which judges pass down are based on perso-
nal prejudices and not some higher dictates, such as those of
natural law. The "Warren Court" of 1962-1969 is recognized as
having been in the vanguard of social progress for it was well
ahead of the popularly elected branches of government - the
legislative and executive- and even public opinion in such areas
as equality of all citizens and the rights of individuals.
Chief Justice Earl Warren and his colleagues led a new revo-
lution in judicial review. They followed almost precisely the
guidelines which Chief Justice Harlan Stone set out for future
Court action in the famous Caroline Products "Footnote."
Stone listed the areas in which the Court should intervene to
be: (1) the First Amendment freedoms because these were pre-
ferred freedoms important to democracy, (2) cases dealing
with minorities because their rights are most likely to be over-
looked in a government by majority rule, and (3) where the
political process is corrupt, for then there is no other recourse
available. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938).
This was the Court on which Justice Arthur Goldberg
served. In the three years he was an Associate Justice,
Goldberg participated in some of the Court's most important
decisions involving judicial activism. Consistently, these were
egalitarian in nature and reflected an acceptance by the intel-
lectual elite of the need for human dignity and equality.
Immediately upon his arrival, Goldberg associated himself
with the activist position on civil liberties cases, often expres-
sing his views on what he felt should be the proper role of the
Court. He asserted that the Courts should take a harder look
at the facts of the case before it and measure these facts against
the commitment of the Constitution to equality and justice
under the law. Stare decisis, he felt, placed an undue burden on
the Court. In a speech given to the Hastings College of Law,
Justice Goldberg illustrated these convictions when he said
"And if, as future advocates, you want a tip from me, spend
more time on your facts than on your law in arguing before our
Court. What you can bring to bear is that infinite detailed know-
ledge of your case and your conviction as an advocate of having
a case that your client is entitled to win."'
THE EFFECTS OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS ON
THE JUDICIARY
While an activist Warren Court operated as a separate force
in government, the complexion of its membership was greatly
influenced by political and personal dynamics within both the
judicial and, most formidably, the executive branches.
'Daniel P. Moynihan, ed., The Defenses of Freedom (New York: Harper &
Row, Publishers, 1966), pp. 134-5.
